After giving the Muslim Brotherhood only a year in office, why did the Egyptian public turn against them? A New York Times article stated that before Morsi’s ouster there was erosion in support for the Brotherhood even in traditional strongholds. This was due to, “confusing economic policies of the Brotherhood-led government.” Another popular complaint against Morsi was that the Brotherhood was, “focusing too exclusively on his (their) Islamist base.”

The first complaint stems from the Brotherhood’s lack of governing experience. However, the second complaint is more foreboding as they go to the heart of the trouble with Islamist politics. Ambivalence about pluralistic values undermines democracy.

The Associated Press (AP) defines Islamists as, “advocate or supporter of a political movement that favors reordering government and society in accordance with laws prescribed by Islam.” AP’s definition is useful but unsatisfying as it fails to distinguish between those who want the values of Islam to inform laws and those who want to impose their parochial interpretations of Shariah (the moral code and religious law of Islam). Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in the Middle East and North Africa and Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) in South Asia want the latter.

In contrast, other political forces in the Muslim world, such as the National Forces Alliance in Libya, favor laws to be guided by the values of Islam but do not wish to impose Shariah. This puts them squarely with the majority. John Esposito and Dalia Mogahed in “Who Speaks for Islam?” noted that “having an enriched religious/spiritual life” is an important priority for Muslims. Majorities in most Muslim countries want Shariah to be “a” not “the” source of legislation. This seems to be no different from the aspirations of a Christian majority country such as the United States. In 2006, Gallup Poll showed 46 percent of Americans saying they want the Bible to be “a” source of legislation.

The upsurge in support for Islamist politics is the confluence of two trends – a repudiation of the disastrous policies of past regimes and a growing view among Muslims that Shariah can be an effective bulwark against the oppressive corruption and monopolization of power by the elite. A recent Pew Poll shows that clear majorities support implementation of Shariah. However, Muslims do not have a unified understanding of what Shariah means in practice. In addition, the survey finds, “most Muslims see no inherent tension between being religiously devout and living in a modern society.” Muslims favor democracy, symbiotic coexistence with others and a system of governance that best reflects their own ethical values. Islamists like the ruling secularists they deposed have not been able to translate this aspiration into effective governance.

How to reconcile the desire for Shariah with the erosion in support for Islamists? The realpolitik of the Islamists that has left many disillusioned. In Egypt, the MB had left the powers of the military unrestrained, much to the chagrin of the Tahrir revolutionaries. In Libya, MB was viewed as pawns of foreign powers such as Qatar. In Bangladesh, the JI has been viewed with suspicion because of anecdotal accounts of their past collaboration with the Pakistani army in slaughtering hundreds of fellow countrymen during Bangladesh’s war of liberation. In Pakistan, the chief of JI described Hakimullah Mehsud, the leader of Pakistani Taliban a martyr.

In Turkey, the conservative AKP came to power as a result of the failures of the secular elite in ensuring broad economic prosperity. During its first two terms AKP succeeded by delivering stunning economic results. All that has begun to crumble as the AKP is now embroiled in corruption scandals and have begun to push conservative social policies going so far as to suggest how many children women should have. AKP’s foreign policy is in shambles. A recent headline in the influential Foreign Policy summed it best, “How Turkey Went From ‘Zero Problems’ to Zero Friends.”  AKP’s growing unpopularity even with religious conservatives, such as the influential Fetahullah Gulen, may represent a turning point in not only Turkish politics but Islamist politics globally.

The twentieth century marked the rise of political Islam, from Jamaat-e-Islami in the South Asia to Muslim Brotherhood in the Middle East and North Africa. But once in power the Islamists, with the exception of the early period of AKP rule, have proven to be ineffective. They are prone to the same abuse of power that characterized the ruling elites they deposed. From Egypt to Bangladesh Muslims are increasingly uneasy. Beyond their utopian slogans that “Islam is the solution,” there is little track record and consensus about how to practically implement Shariah in a way that will deliver economic and social justice for all people. Islamists need to espouse a more secular vision that is inclusive of all people and not subservient to their base. Secularists need to spiritualize their politics by espousing public policies that better reflect the public’s aspiration that fulfill the objectives of Shariah. Politicization of Shariah and Shariahization of politics are a disservice to the faith of Islam and they have proven to be divisive thus far.

This article first ran on Turkey’s leading English daily, Today’s Zaman.

In 2011, along with millions of people around the world, I was mesmerized by the peaceful popular uprisings in Tahrir Square that eventually led to the end of three decades of dictatorial rule in Egypt. As the youth cheered, I felt solidarity in declaring “we are all Egyptians now.” I cannot say the same now. Two years ago Egyptians rejoiced in unison as the birth of people’s power seemed possible. Today many of the same people seem apathetic to army bullets killing fellow Egyptians.

Long before the General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi forcibly removed Mohammed Morsi from the Presidency, Egyptian society was descending into a spiral of polarization. A poll conducted in May of 2013 by the Arab American Institute showed that more than 90 percent of those who identified with the Islamists said they were “better off” than five years ago. However, more than 80 percent of those associated with the opposition and the “disaffected plurality” claimed that they were “worse off.” Among those Egyptians not affiliated with either the Islamists or their opposition only one percent claims that they are better off today while 83 percent perceived that they are worse off. And yet such disaffection does not justify a coup d’etat, which has only exasperated polarization not resolved it.

The Egyptian military is like a hammer that sees every political problem as an existential security nail. So predictably, knowing only how to wield a hammer, they resorted to solving a political problem by hammering a nail into the coffin of democracy. And while they did so, many Egyptians cheered, unfazed by irony that they were essentially burning the village to purportedly save it.

While the military is blameworthy the Muslim Brotherhood can hardly claim innocence because they failed to pay heed to the disaffection that preceded their rise to power. A 2012 opinion survey by Brookings showed that 71 percent of Egyptians felt that it was a mistake for the Brotherhood to renege on their promise to not field a candidate for the Presidency. The Brotherhood incorrectly perceived their electoral victory as a mandate to inject religion into politics. While 6 in 10 Egyptians wanted Sharia to be the basis of Egyptian law, 83 percent wanted Sharia to be adapted to modern times. Fifty-four percent of those surveyed wanted the Egyptian democracy to be modeled after Turkey, a secular republic currently being successfully ruled by moderate Islamists (the Gezi park fiasco notwithstanding).

Most of all, Egyptians sought good governance and a relief from the crushing 13.2 percent unemployment that has resulted in 8 out of every 10 jobless Egyptians being under the age of 30 with more than a quarter of them holding university degrees. The Brotherhood by pursuing a parochial agenda essentially missed an opportunity to demonstrate that like Turkey’s Islamists they were a marked improvement over the regime they replaced. Not all of its failings were their fault though. The New York Times recently reported that Egypt’s deep state had conspired to make the Morsi government look bad. The day after Morsi was ousted, gas supplies and electrical power magically returned to normalcy.

Despite my euphoria in 2011, I had sounded a cautionary alarm, “Standing at the edge of a new dawn, one cannot help but be hopeful. But this euphoria of hope should not detract attention from a basic fact — democracy is a process, not an outcome. The process requires engagement and vigilance. Removing a dictatorial regime is not enough, for democracy is not merely the rule of the majority but also necessitates the protection of minority rights and voices.”

The Brotherhood missed an opportunity to unite Egypt by creating an inclusive constitutional process, underscored by the fact that only 1 in 3 eligible voters participated in the constitutional referendum. The opposition was just as incompetent by being unable to mount a viable counter narrative and now appears unscrupulous by cheering a coup d’etat that is witnessing the return of the old Mubarak cronies. The Brotherhood and its opposition each in their zeal to prevail are blinded to the reality that only a democratic and inclusive Egypt that respects the dignity of all its citizens, including women and all minorities will truly honor the aspirations of the Arab Spring when Egypt stood united and people worlds away from Tahrir felt like saying we are all Egyptians now. Two years ago, the millions on the street inspired hope. Today they evoke fear.

We are all Egyptians now

I am mesmerized by the peaceful popular uprisings calling for the end of three decades of dictatorial rule in Egypt. Often the news from the Muslim world is depressing. Not today. The impact of this is still unknown.

But one thing is unmistakably clear: We are all Egyptians now. The young voices from Egypt fill me with hope and optimism about the future of the Middle East and the Muslim world. In the unlikeliest of places and in the most trying of circumstances, the Egyptians are not just demanding their freedoms but, unbeknownst to them, are helping to shatter several myths along the way.

The unforgettable images from Tahrir Square are helping to erase the myth of Muslims and Arabs being apathetic to democracy and docile to authoritarian rule. It is also erasing the lore of the archetypal Muslim male — conservative and angry — and the stereotypical Muslim woman — compliant and veiled. Like any other society, Muslim communities boast a range of voices. Many practicing Muslims favor separation between mosque and state, viewing this as a position closer to normative Islam, while others desire that national laws reflect their religious values, fervent in their belief that such an action is pleasing to God.

Along with the Jasmine Revolution of Tunisia, the popular uprising in Egypt is a deathblow to the urban legend that change in Muslim societies can only be brought about by force. For over a decade al-Qaeda and its affiliates have successfully exploited the lack of freedoms and dignity in parts of the Muslim world to foment terrorism, euphemistically calling them martyrdom operations. Overwhelming majorities in Tunisia and Egypt by their actions emphatically rejected the nihilism of al-Qaeda. They instead chose the Gandhian approach of non-violence and peaceful assembly to redress their grievances. This sign of hope must not be extinguished by the intransigence of Hosni Mubarak to step down. Orderly transition cannot be a pretext to extending his iron-fisted rule.

Equally impressive is the shattering of yet another myth, often the bedrock assumption behind America’s unquestioned support for the Mubaraks and the Abdullahs of the world. For long the Mubaraks and the Abdullahs have sold the notion, and America bought the idea, that choices in the Muslim world are bipolar — the ruthless dictator or the parochial religious fundamentalist. To most Muslims these are false choices. Like their counterparts in other parts of the world, most Muslims care less about the ideology of their government and more about the services which that government can deliver. Palestinians in Gaza did not choose Hamas for their ideological bent, but rather they voted Fatah out for failing to deliver basic services to the people. Many Turks may not agree with the socio-religious views of their conservative prime minister, but time and again they back his party at the polls because they deliver on their promises of good governance.

The young voices in Tahrir Square showed that in a few days of freedom they have earned a lifetime of wisdom. Even when angry at Israel’s treatment of Palestinians they did not want their new government to walk away from Egypt’s peace treaty with Israel. While remaining skeptical about the motives of the Muslim Brotherhood, they welcomed diverse voices in the new Egypt. Their disappointments over American foreign policy did not make them break out into anti-American chants. When the state apparatus failed to protect innocent civilians from looters and thugs, youths acted in an impromptu fashion to protect the dignity of their families and their communities. Egyptians and Tunisians have best exemplified the slogan “Yes, we can.”

Standing at the edge of a new dawn, one cannot help but be hopeful. But this euphoria of hope should not detract attention from a basic fact — democracy is a process, not an outcome. The process requires engagement and vigilance. Removing a dictatorial regime is not enough, for democracy is not merely the rule of the majority but also necessitates the protection of minority rights and voices.

In my visits to Egypt I have always been impressed by the sense of civilizational pride that ordinary citizens expressed, from college campuses to coffee shops. Egyptians now have a chance to put their pride in their long legacy of monumental civilizational achievements to good use. Watching from afar, we may not be able to help much, but at the very least we can pray that the extraordinary sacrifices of the most ordinary amongst us is not wasted. Rather, it serves as a powerful motivator to truly usher in a new era of peace and healing to one of the most troubled regions of the world.

Additional Reading: Egypt’s Revolution: How Democracy Can Work in the Middle East
By Fareed Zakaria

Huffington Post, Feb 1, 2011
Florida Times Union, Feb 2, 2011
A Sputnik Moment for U.S. Foreign Policy

The Jasmine Revolution has led to the ouster of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, the autocratic leader of Tunisia and has sparked similar revolutionary fervor from Algeria to Egypt. The success in Tunisia has emboldened protestors across the Middle East demanding greater freedom and dignity. The many unforgettable images of the demonstrators are helping to erase the myth of Muslims and Arabs being apathetic to democracy and docile to authoritarian rule. Democracy deficiency has been a fact of life in the Middle East not because the people did not want it but because for decades American support propped up the Arab dictators, all in the name of stability. This policy is now in shambles. Today the region can boast neither stability nor freedom. The “Sputnik moment” opportunity is to reorient the arc of U.S. foreign policy from being solely motivated by American national interests to being guided by the universal values of freedom, liberty, rule of law and democracy.

American Presidents, both Republican and Democrats, have not been totally callous about the lack of freedom and liberty in the Middle East. But they have always made the need for stability in a region whose natural resources (oil) fuels America’s economic engine a more urgent priority. Although Egypt and Jordan does not supply the U.S. with oil, their peace treaty with Israel makes them important linchpins of American foreign policy. The dictators in the region obviously know all that and gladly play the fear-card to keep America in their corner, no matter how diametrically opposed their domestic policies are to American values. The Abdullahs and the Mubaraks have for decades successfully invoked the specter of religious hardliners coming to power in the absence of their iron-fisted rules. The distinction between religious conservatives and lawless terrorists were maliciously and deliberately blurred. With Western support Mubarak had cracked down on political opposition often in the name of fighting terrorism. Decades of such actions seeded the violence that convulses much of the Middle East today.

The Iranian experience provided a further pretext. The toppling of an unpopular U.S. puppet, the Shah, was followed by a government hostile to Western interests and restrictive of the freedom and liberty of its own people. When faced with calls for greater democracy, the U.S. foreign policy establishment often argued that the removal of a dictator in the Middle East will not necessarily increase the chances of a liberal democracy in the region. Underlying this assumption is a fallacy that often drives American public opinion about Islam, Muslims and the Arabs — the propensity to judge vast swaths of people, spanning different cultural backgrounds and historical experiences, with the worst behavior or examples from that part of the world.

For every Iran there is a Turkey. Muslims are neither monolithic nor merely shaped by their religious beliefs. Turkey and Bangladesh for example have held on to their secular democracy, even when religious conservatives rose to power. Instead of using the fear of an Iranian-type religious takeover in Egypt as a pretext to extend President Hosni Mubarak’s authoritarian rule, it will be far better to take into account the unique cultural contours of Egypt.

With its three millennium of civilizational experience, Egypt is far more tolerant and pluralistic than many on the outside are led to believe. While religious movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood enjoy some support in Egypt, they are not universally adored. Although, it is likely that in an open and democratic Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood will play some role (unlikely to be dominant), there is no need to fear monger such a possibility. The next Egyptian regime will have to bear in mind that the so-called Arab street is now wide awake. They will not tolerate any government that fails to meet the demands of their people. If a brutal dictator ruling with the unqualified support of the West could be removed in a few days of street protests, as in Tunisia with Egypt hopefully being next, then no regime that rules without the consent of the governed will ever be safe. In addition, the successes, both at home and abroad, of a religiously conservative government in secular Turkey provide a practical model for conservative political forces to emulate in the region.

The time has come for the U.S. government to demonstrate to the Arab and Muslim world that it is indeed on the side of the people. Support for the true democratic aspirations of the people in the region can go a long way in restoring America’s image in the Arab and Muslim world. Anything less will only plunge these societies into further darkness from whence could emerge ever more dangerous reactionary and militant forces. The Sputnik moment has arrived. Will President Obama exhibit transformational leadership to provide meaningful American support in transitioning this region to democratic rule of law? Will the Egyptian people see America on their side or will they interpret the mantra of “orderly transition” as code for keeping the Mubarak regime alive, albeit on life support.